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The European Orphan Medicinal Products (OMP) Regulation has successfully encouraged research to develop
treatments for rare diseases resulting in the authorisation of new OMPs in Europe. While decisions on OMP
designation and marketing authorisation are made at the European Union level, reimbursement decisions are
made at the national level. OMP value and affordability are high priority issues for policymakers and decisions
regarding their pricing and funding are highly complex. There is currently no European consensus on how OMP
value should be assessed and inequalities of access to OMPs have previously been observed. Against this
background, policy makers in many countries are considering reforms to improve access to OMPs. This paper
proposes ten principles to be considered when undertaking such reforms, from the perspective of an OMP
manufacturer. We recommend the continued prioritisation of rare diseases by policymakers, an increased
alignment between payer and regulatory frameworks, pricing centred on OMP value, and mechanisms to ensure
long-term financial sustainability allowing a continuous and virtuous development of OMPs. Our recommendations
support the development of more consistent frameworks and encourage collaboration between all stakeholders,
including research-based industry, payers, clinicians, and patients.
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The growth in the number of approved orphan medi-
cinal products (OMPs) in Europe since the introduc-
tion of legislation in 2000 has been a success for rare
disease patients, the scientific and medical community,
European and national policymakers, and the pharma-
ceutical industry. To date, one hundred and twelve
(112) OMPs [1] have received marketing authorisation
in Europe for the treatment of rare diseases associated
with high unmet need and limited suitable therapeutic
options [2,3]. Given the estimated 5000–8000 rare dis-
eases that affect 6–8% of the European Union (EU)
population (between 27 and 36 million people [4]),
greater momentum in OMP development and approval
will be necessary if the public health burden of rare dis-
eases is to be addressed.
Whether this goal is reached will be determined in
part by the outcome of an ongoing debate about the
value of OMPs and the mechanisms by which* Correspondence: adam.hutchings@dolon.com
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fund such treatments [5-9]. While the regulatory
framework has been adapted to the specificities of
OMPs by creating an expert Committee for Orphan
Medicinal Products (COMP) within the European
Medicines Agency (EMA), many national pricing and
reimbursement systems have not been adapted to re-
spond to the specific challenges of these types of
drugs.
Regional and local inequalities of access to OMPs
have previously been observed in Europe, where
Member States have responsibility for health policy
[10-13]. Such variations can be due to restrictions of
reimbursement or funding, either because of a nega-
tive assessment by policymakers or because the drug
has not been considered for reimbursement [10,11,14-17].
Negative reimbursement decisions can reflect prob-
lems in applying standard pricing and reimbursement
processes to OMPs [18]. An awareness of this issue
has led some European countries to adapt their
processes to reflect the specificities of OMPs [6,12,19-22].
For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) the Nationalal. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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recently created a separate programme for ultra-rare
drugs that uses different assessment criteria to those
applied to treatments for more common disorders
[23,24].
Despite important initiatives to improve conformity
of OMP assessment methods for reimbursement pur-
poses at a European level, there is as yet no consensus
on how OMP value should be evaluated [20]. This un-
certainty has important consequences for healthcare
policy makers, manufacturers and patients. Healthcare
policymakers may lack confidence in the ability of their
healthcare systems to ensure optimal patient access to
OMPs while ensuring value for money and long-term
financial sustainability. Manufacturers often face an un-
clear, inconsistent and changing array of systems and
policies that create uncertainty about the long-term return
from OMP development and provide little clarity of the
data requirements to adequately ensure patient access [14].
Given the magnitude of the public health challenge in
rare diseases it is important that pricing and reimburse-
ment systems for OMPs are reformed to provide more
consistent assessment of value and to be more closely
aligned with regulatory frameworks for OMPs. This
paper addresses this problem from the perspective of a
biopharmaceutical manufacturer that has invested –
and continues to invest – significantly in OMP research
and development. It seeks to contribute to the debate
on the OMP model by proposing a set of principles to
improve the consistency, effectiveness and sustainabil-
ity of OMP value assessment mechanisms in Europe,
while maintaining flexibility and innovation in decision
making between countries (Table 1). Ultimately, the
ambition is to create a European OMP value frame-
work that rewards innovation and ensures sustainability
of the OMP model.Table 1 Overview of principles
Sections Principles
Value Assessment 1: National pricing and reimbursement processes
2: National Authorities should incorporate rare dis
3: OMP assessment should consider all relevant el
4: Value assessment methods for OMPs should inc
5: Value mechanisms should be flexible to accom
Innovation and Price 6: Adequate funding should be provided to ensur
7: OMP reimbursement decisions should be deter
characteristics
8: If used, ICER thresholds should be modulated t
Sustainability of OMP
Model
9: National authorities should develop adaptive an
and after value assessment
10: Rational and evidence-based funding mechanDiscussion
Value assessment of OMPs
Principle 1: National pricing and reimbursement processes
should acknowledge the COMP’s assessment of therapeutic
benefit
The European OMP Regulation defines rare diseases
as having a prevalence of no more than 5 in 10,000
people, and as diseases that are life-threatening or
chronically debilitating [2,3]. Due to their inherent rar-
ity and complexity, these diseases are often less well
characterised or understood. There is often limited in-
formation on rare disease pathophysiology, mecha-
nisms or genesis, a lack of relevant animal models and
problems with accurate diagnosis [25]. Information on
the disease process, epidemiology, prognosis, and bur-
den is also often incomplete. Current standard of
care treatments may be poorly established with little
evidence of effectiveness [26]. As well as a lack of in-
formation about the disease as currently managed,
evidence for new treatments can be difficult to inter-
pret [27].
There is therefore a need for specific expert involve-
ment in the benefit assessment of OMPs, a point recog-
nised in the conception of OMP Regulation [28]:
“Gathering expertise at European level is therefore
paramount in order to ensure equal access to accurate
information, appropriate and timely diagnosis and high
quality care for rare disease patients.”
In establishing the COMP within the EMA, the OMP
Regulation provided for such expert involvement in
regulatory decision-making. In addition, the OMP Regu-
lation set out specific criteria for the assessment of a
medicinal product that applies for an OMP designation
and authorisation [2,29].
In the criteria to obtain the designation of orphan drug
(Article 3 of Regulation (EC) 141/2000) it is clearlyshould acknowledge the EMA’s assessment of therapeutic benefit
ease expertise within their local assessment processes
ements of value
orporate multiple criteria
modate evidential uncertainty at time of OMP approval
e optimal patient access to OMPs and to incentivise research
mined by benchmarking value and price against treatments with similar
o reflect the specificities of rare diseases and OMPs
d efficient processes to optimise use of real world data collected before
isms should be developed to guarantee long-term sustainability
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OMP where
(1)“there exists no satisfactory method of diagnosis,
prevention or treatment of the condition in question
that has been authorized in the European Union or”,
(2)“if such method exists, that the medicinal product
will be of significant benefit to those affected by that
condition”.
The European regulatory framework for OMPs there-
fore went beyond the safety, efficacy and quality require-
ments for other drugs by specifying that for OMPs,
manufacturers also need to demonstrate in certain cases
that the product provides significant benefit for the tar-
geted patient population, defined as ‘a clinically relevant
advantage or a major contribution to patient care’ [30].
Given the rare disease expertise that exists within the
COMP, it is important for national reimbursement mecha-
nisms to be consistent with the scientific assessment per-
formed under the European regulatory decision making
process [31,32]. National, regional and local pricing and re-
imbursement authorities remain competent with regards to
the funding of OMPs, but their assessment should acknow-
ledge the existence of a clinical advantage, when such bene-
fit has been established through OMP designation [18].
This principle is incorporated into the pricing and re-
imbursement rules in Germany. The “innovativeness”
and the added medical benefit for OMPs is assumed by
law (Sec. 35a, subs. 1 clause 10 Social Code Book Vol-
ume V, Sozialgesetzbuch Band V – SGB V), representing
a deferment by the Federal Joint Committee to the
COMP assessment regarding OMP benefit [33]. This de-
ferment is limited to OMPs with a yearly turnover of less
than EUR 50 million.
Principle 2: National authorities should incorporate rare
disease expertise within their local assessment processes
As with the regulatory process, national policy makers
should ensure local disease specific expertise is incorpo-
rated into the value assessment process [16]. In the com-
mon absence of robust observational data, expert insight –
both from health care professionals (HCP) and patients – is
very important [14]. Thus when assessing value in rare dis-
eases, there should be careful consideration of qualitative
evidence alongside the quantitative. A full understanding of
these often complex diseases can only be achieved through
testimony from HCPs, patients, carers and family members.
The importance of involving patients in the development
of medicines has become widely recognised and increas-
ingly accepted. Patient experts provide input into the design
and endpoints of clinical trials, have a voice in regulatory
decisions and are frequently important stakeholders in
health technology assessment (HTA) processes [34,35].First hand testimony on the patient experience can help to
redress the absence of published observational data in rare
diseases and help policymakers understand the relevance
and context of unfamiliar clinical endpoints [18,36,37].
Patient involvement is particularly important in rare dis-
eases because the difficulty patients face in obtaining ap-
propriate care mean that they often have no choice but to
become experts in their own condition. Equally, physicians
managing patients with rare diseases might not always see
a sufficient volume of patients to be able to correctly char-
acterise the full range of symptoms and disease manifesta-
tions across different patient segments [16].
In practice, this implies a need for more systematic
and meaningful involvement of patients and HCPs into
value assessment processes for OMPs. At a national
level, rare disease expert involvement is important be-
cause representatives on standing committees within
assessment agencies may never have encountered a par-
ticular rare disease, and may have no specific knowledge
of the patient experience [16].
Representation from experts with knowledge of treat-
ment patterns for a rare disease at a national and inter-
national level is key. Input from multiple disease experts
and centres may be required [31]. Clinical experts are
likely to be chosen from reference centres for the disease
in question within the country in which the value assess-
ment is taking place. For diseases where there is no avail-
able national expertise, a European or international expert
could be consulted [37]. Clinical expertise should be
sought not just from physicians but also nurse experts
who can often provide additional context on the full care
pathway for patients, beyond pharmaceutical management.
The involvement of such experts will provide national
authorities with a better understanding of the disease
context, thus reducing the risk of an OMP being ex-
cluded from reimbursement without careful consider-
ation of the specificities of the rare disease and their
impact on its evaluation. In particular, such experts can
provide national assessment bodies with information
that might otherwise be unavailable on issues such as
disease morbidity, patient disability and prognosis [16].
Principle 3: OMP assessment should consider all relevant
elements of value
There are some key specificities of rare diseases and
OMPs that are essential to their value, but are not consist-
ently considered in national value assessments, such as
disease severity, the lack of a suitable alternative treatment
(unmet need) and rarity [6,16,38].
Traditional measures of health outcome such as
Quality- and Disability-Adjusted Life Years (QALY/DALY)
are not always sensitive to the disease severity of the pa-
tient population [6,27]. Proportional improvements in
health outcome generate smaller QALY gains in severe
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cularly affects OMPs as by definition they target life-
threatening or chronically debilitating diseases [6,39].
Patients often have a very poor prognosis and quality of
life compared to the general population. In most cases,
even with the introduction of a new therapeutic option
with proven benefits, the health status of these patients
will remain relatively modest compared to the general
population. In this context traditional health outcomes
analysis might conclude that the clinical benefit is modest
[6,39]. However, due to the severity of these diseases, for
these particular patients, the clinical benefit is important.
The absence of effective or well-documented standard al-
ternative treatments also complicates the assessment of
OMPs. Frequently, there is disagreement about which
treatment to use as the comparator within an OMP assess-
ment [6,39]. The comparators used for price benchmarking
of OMPs are often old, generic and without proven efficacy
(and sometimes used off-license). Even if the standard of
care is recognised as ineffective, it will still be a price
benchmark in many pricing and reimbursement systems
[6]. In addition, in cases where the current standard of care
treatments may be poorly established, there is often a lack
of information on the additional healthcare costs associ-
ated with poorly controlled disease. As a result, the incre-
mental cost of OMPs is overstated, leading to complex
discussions between the manufacturer and authorities.
Thus, the lack of a suitable alternative treatment – the
main driver for OMP legislation – can negatively affect
OMP value assessment by authorities. To counter this ef-
fect, unmet medical need should be recognised as a signifi-
cant component of the value of a new drug [6,16,38].
Differences in disease prevalence also have implica-
tions for the level of disease understanding, the quality
of evidence of treatment benefit and the price of the
drug [40]. While rarity is not necessarily considered an
important element of value per se, it ought to be consid-
ered during assessment due to its effect on these other
factors.
Principle 4: Value assessment methods for OMPs should
incorporate multiple criteria
Multi-criteria assessment methods offer an opportunity to
fully incorporate all relevant elements of OMP value into
a funding decision in a structured, transparent and con-
sistent manner [41]. This is in contrast to HTA methods
based on cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) which usually
include a narrower range of value elements and provides
less flexibility in the decision-making process [6].
A number of authors have proposed multi-criteria assess-
ment frameworks for OMPs, arguing that they allow for
the explicit consideration of rare disease specificities
[7,42,43]. For example, the European Commission Working
Group on Mechanism of Coordinated Access to OrphanMedicinal Products proposed a Transparent Value Frame-
work for OMPs that utilised a multi-criteria approach [44].
Similar multi-criteria methods are used within the English
and French healthcare systems when making funding deci-
sions on rare disease treatments [16,45].
The advantage of multi-criteria assessment for OMPs
lies in providing a structured framework that enables the
systematic and transparent incorporation of value ele-
ments important to the decision situation [46,47]. They
can formally incorporate OMP specific elements (such
as rarity, severity, unmet need), and assess the degree of
added-value they represent for the health care system
[42,48]. In addition, multi-criteria frameworks also pro-
vide the flexibility to allow for the incorporation of more
subjective factors, such as ethical issues relating to rare
disease patient access to treatment, the rule of rescue,
equity of opportunity for patients to benefit, and the pa-
tient’s perspective.
Principle 5: Value mechanisms should be flexible to
accommodate evidential uncertainty at time of OMP
approval
The existence of evidential uncertainty does not mean that
a product lacks value or is insufficiently researched. Clin-
ical uncertainty affects nearly all innovative medicines at
the time of approval, regardless of patient population sizes.
Quantitative uncertainty, however, is greater in rare dis-
eases because of smaller patient populations [14].
The willingness to accept uncertainty around OMP
value parameters should be determined relative to the
specificities of each disease: the prevalence and hetero-
geneity of the patient population, the level of knowledge
of the disease, its natural history, the availability of
established surrogate endpoints and the efficacy of com-
parator products [15,31].
Value assessment mechanisms that allow for both
qualitative and quantitative assessment of clinical benefit
are more likely to be sensitive to the context of data gen-
eration than purely quantitative approaches, such as
CEA [49]. Nevertheless, statistical uncertainty is an in-
herent problem in rare diseases, regardless of assessment
model, and efforts should be made to ensure it is not a
systematic impediment to OMP access [50]. Mecha-
nisms to manage this uncertainty and to improve under-
standing of clinical benefit are discussed in Principle 9.
Innovation and price
Principle 6: Adequate funding should be provided to ensure
optimal patient access to OMPs and to incentivise research
In the 30 years preceding the introduction of the European
OMP Regulation pharmaceutical innovation was focused
on more common diseases, reflecting scientific research
priorities, aggregate patient need and commercial viability
[51]. The resulting improvement in care levels led to a
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between individuals with prevalent diseases and those
with rare diseases. The OMP Regulation was an explicit
incentive to encourage pharmaceutical companies to pri-
oritise investment in rare diseases with unmet need and
to redress the imbalance in opportunity for health gain
[26,49,52]. However, although this goal is explicit in OMP
Regulation, it is not always a specific objective of national
health policy programmes [2,53] nor pricing and reim-
bursement frameworks.
OMP funding is contentious, primarily because of
the sometimes high per-patient cost of OMPs (although
some OMPs have similar prices to non-OMP drugs)
[54]. It is generally accepted that the small patient num-
bers in rare diseases mean that the cost per patient of
OMPs is likely to be higher than treatments for more
prevalent conditions [55]. This is inevitable if manufac-
turers are to recoup research and development expend-
iture and be incentivised to develop treatments for rare
diseases [54-57].
Payers and policy makers within each Member States
should acknowledge the need to incentivise OMP devel-
opment through pricing and reimbursement systems, as
OMP development is impossible if prices are con-
strained to those of drugs for common diseases with big-
ger patient populations [6]. Companies invest in OMPs
because, if successful in developing effective treatments,
they expect positive returns on investment [54]. By
prioritising rare disease research, policymakers endorse
positions established in the late 1990s that encouraged
pharmaceutical companies to shift Research and Devel-
opment (R&D) emphasis away from “me-too” drugs in
prevalent primary care diseases towards innovative treat-
ments for severe diseases in which treatments were un-
available [6]. Without some allowance for higher OMP
prices, it is unlikely that the recent growth in research
investment in this field will continue, and the consider-
able need in rare diseases will remain unmet [49]. Simi-
larly, given the small numbers of patients affected, and
the great challenges inherent in attempting to predict
patient response, decisions to restrict reimbursement to
sub-groups within the licensed indication should be a
last resort.
When innovation is successful, access to this innovation
will inevitably require, in the short-term, additional invest-
ment from healthcare. The recent growth in orphan drug
expenditure is a natural consequence of the recent
innovation in disease areas that were hitherto untreat-
able [14,54]. However, the growth of OMP expenditures
is expected to be manageable over time and should not
undermine the sustainability of the healthcare system.
Currently, OMP expenditure is estimated to account
for 1%–4% of all pharmaceutical expenditure [54] and
is expected to grow to approximately 5% by 2020remaining stable overtime [58]. The end of patent pro-
tection and marketing exclusivity will allow the intro-
duction of generics and price reduction, this will create
financial room for the introduction of new orphan
drugs [58]. This principle, however, does not exempt
pharmaceutical companies from their obligation to jus-
tify their prices based on a sound value assessment.
Principle 7: OMP reimbursement decisions should be
determined by benchmarking value and price against
treatments with similar characteristics
Working within a flexible value framework, OMP reim-
bursement should be determined according to the added
value derived from treatment as assessed through an
appropriate process that captures the most relevant rare
disease value elements (see Principle 3). It is clearly under-
stood that there is, and will be, variability in the value of
OMPs [36], and pricing and reimbursement frameworks
should reflect this. Added value must be established in a
way that allows for comparisons with other OMPs with
similar characteristics, including rarity, disease severity or
drug development complexity. By establishing added value
relative to a cohort of similar OMPs, the reimbursement
can accordingly be determined against the spectrum of
prices for that type of OMP.
Funding status would be established relative to the
price of other similar treatments and conditions rather
than to the price of existing treatments for the same dis-
ease (as occurs in common disorders). Because of the
nature of OMPs which, by definition, are for diseases in
which no adequate treatments are available, the prices of
existing treatments are insufficient to incentivise OMP
development [57]. Instead, OMP prices should be an-
chored within the current price range of OMPs for dis-
eases with a similar prevalence, with the specific price
determined by the added value relative to those other
treatments.
Principle 8: If used, ICER thresholds should be modulated to
reflect the specificities of rare diseases and OMPs
There has been considerable debate in OMP policy lit-
erature about the appropriateness of using CEA as a
decision-making tool in rare diseases [6,38,59-61]. Un-
certainties around rare disease clinical parameters, com-
bined with unknown economic variables, can render
such a broad range of incremental cost-effectiveness ra-
tios (ICERs) that they are often meaningless [55,62].
While many authors have suggested that CEA should
play a limited role in OMP assessment, others have ar-
gued that it is feasible, provided adjustments are made
to reflect OMP specificities [6,7,43,63].
Experience to date suggests that the use of a multi-
criteria framework might be more suitable than an
OMP-adapted CEA. Countries such as France and Italy,
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than as the driver of decisions, have been seen to have
relatively high patient access to OMPs [11,15].
If a CEA framework is used, ICER thresholds should be
modulated accordingly. Changes to ICER thresholds should
adjust for value criteria that are not routinely captured
within a CEA framework, such as the disease severity,
unmet need (availability of alternatives) and disease preva-
lence. Weighting should be explicit and consider estab-
lished public policy choices and societal preferences to
encourage OMP development [7,43,63,64].
Higher ICER thresholds have been seen to have some
success for certain types of OMPs – particularly treat-
ments for rare oncological diseases – where trial designs
and endpoints have been more conducive to CEA as-
sessment. For example, in England end-of-life guidance
allowed a higher ICER of up to £50,000 per QALY for
patients with a particularly poor prognosis [65]. Six of
nine oncological OMPs that have been appraised under
this exemption have received a full or partial recommen-
dation [66]. However, for many non-oncological OMPs,
this approach has not improved access.
Sustainability of OMP model
Principle 9: National authorities should develop adaptive
and efficient processes to optimise use of real world data
collected before and after value assessment
Pricing and reimbursement assessments of OMPs are
complicated by uncertainty relating to the clinical profile
and evidence base of a new treatment. Standard pharma-
ceutical value assessment processes place great emphasis
on the quantity and quality of clinical data, as measured
by statistical measures of variance and the familiarity of
endpoint metrics [6,27]. The nature of rare disease re-
search makes it extremely hard to generate sufficient data
to meet the evidence levels expected of treatments for
common disorders within HTA processes [18,31,37,67].
Early access programmes offer opportunities for pol-
icymakers to incorporate real-world, locally-derived data
into the value assessment process while facilitating pa-
tient access to new drugs for diseases with great unmet
need. Such programmes have been effective in France,
Italy and the Netherlands [20,68]. For example, the
French Autorisations Temporaires d’Utilisation (ATU)
scheme provides early access to new promising treat-
ments where a genuine public health need exists [69,70].
To qualify, there must be no available satisfactory alter-
native treatment and the new treatment must show ex-
pected clinical benefit, and an acceptable benefit/risk
ratio; these criteria are often relevant for OMPs [71].
Data collection is mandatory within the ATU scheme,
which can then be referenced by the Transparency Com-
mittee during value assessment. In total, 72% of the 64
authorised OMPs were available through the ATUscheme [71], ensuring high levels of OMP patient access
in France.
Patient registries and post-authorisation safety studies
offer opportunities to capture patient-level data on clinical
and economic outcomes and are increasingly standard re-
quirements as part of local registration and policymaker
assessment [5,19,32,37,60,72]. Registries for OMP indica-
tions should be flexible enough to collect sufficient data
and account for evolutions in patient populations and
treatments over time. It has been recommended that
registries be standardised at the EU level with coordin-
ation of evidence requirements between the EU and mem-
ber states [72], for instance, through greater collaboration
with the COMP [73].
In cases where clinical uncertainty is deemed too large
at the time of reimbursement, policymakers may link
reimbursement to subsequent real world outcomes
[5,18,31,32,39,43,55,67,74]. Conditional reimbursement
programmes, whereby OMPs are reimbursed if they
prove effective in real world settings, can be combined
with registries to allow on-going monitoring of their use,
efficacy and value. These should form part of post-
marketing surveillance programmes that will also moni-
tor OMP uptake [5,18,31,32,39,55,67,74].
Principle 10: Rational and evidence-based funding
mechanisms should be developed to guarantee long-term
sustainability
Financial uncertainty around OMP expenditure is a gen-
eral concern because of potential budget impact variabil-
ity. Authorities are rarely able to accurately predict the
uptake rate of new medicines, a situation exacerbated in
rare diseases by the relative paucity of epidemiological
data on the number of patients for whom the medicine
might be appropriate [67]. Where OMPs have high per-
patient prices, small changes in patient numbers can re-
sult in significant budget impact changes compared with
initial forecasts. However, while the variation in budget
impact for a single drug might be quite high, variation in
aggregate OMP expenditure is likely to be much lower
[54] and the emphasis on reducing financial uncertainty
at a drug level may therefore, be less important than ini-
tially assumed.
To manage a specific risk of financial uncertainty that
could endanger the sustainable introduction of new
OMPs over time, specific financial mechanisms may be
established. These may include price/volume agree-
ments, budget caps, and ‘payback’ mechanisms linked to
budget impact forecasts agreed with policymakers at
reimbursement [6,19,55,59-61,68,72,74]. But it should be
the policymaker’s responsibility to demonstrate that
there is sufficient financial uncertainty around a new
product to unbalance sustainability of OMP funding.
Without this requirement, there is a risk that such
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undermine OMP value. Authorities should be careful
not to label situations where the price is considered ex-
cessive as ‘uncertain’. True uncertainty regarding budget
impact is principally related to patient life expectancy
and the number of patients likely to be treated. The
management of the growth of OMP expenditures should
be primarily done through solid and consistent decisions
regarding prices and reimbursement of new products.Summary
The OMP Regulation can be considered an example of
successful health policy making. Recognition of the
considerable unmet need for rare disease patients led
to policy makers explicitly prioritising the development
of treatments for these conditions. As a result the
pharmaceutical industry quickly responded to these
incentives. The Orphan Medicinal Product Regulation
has thus contributed to boosting research, development
and marketing of OMPs in Europe after decades in which
no new treatments were approved.
However, OMP access is still variable in Europe, reflect-
ing a lack of consensus between countries on how to assess
the value of OMPs and what constitutes a fair price [18].
The discussions on this topic reflect a broader debate con-
cerning on the one hand, the sustainability of funding,
while on the other, acknowledging the need for continuous
research into rare diseases. Addressing these challenges is
a shared concern. Thus to contribute to the debate this
paper puts forward a number of practical recommenda-
tions from the perspective of a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer to help provide a more consistent value assessment
framework for orphan drugs that rewards innovation and
ensures the sustainability of the OMP model.
Value assessment frameworks should be adapted to
OMP specificities. Practically, this means ensuring the
involvement of rare disease experts in national and local
reimbursement decision making processes as well as the
acknowledgement by national and local authorities of
the expertise within the EMA COMP and consideration
for its assessment of added therapeutic benefit. Pricing
and reimbursement systems at national levels do not
unanimously address specific OMP characteristics when
considering their value, thus affecting patient access to
OMPs. Value assessment frameworks should be flexible
enough to reflect the specificities of rare diseases, such
as the disease burden and lack of therapeutic alternatives
[6,16,38]. There is a growing consensus that multi-
criteria frameworks are particularly well-suited to cap-
turing these specificities in rare diseases [42,43,64].
Patient access to OMPs can be optimised by using eco-
nomic analysis adjunctively, rather than relying on incre-
mental cost-effectiveness as the main driver of decisions.Policymakers can account for higher clinical uncertainty
in OMP compared to other drug valuations through adap-
tive reimbursement processes. The magnitude of the un-
met need in rare diseases creates an imperative for OMPs
to be quickly accessible to patients. Emphasis should be
on demonstrating clinical benefit and safety, while gener-
ating further value data post-authorisation, for example, in
the form of European registries.
Finally, if the burden of rare disease is to be reduced,
the prioritisation of rare diseases by policy makers
through the OMP Regulation needs to be matched by
the explicit prioritisation of funding for OMPs. Prices
for rare disease treatments should be benchmarked
against treatments with similar characteristics accord-
ing to the degree of added value provided. Such price
levels have been proven to be sufficient to incentivise a
significant shift in R&D investment. Such incentives
should be balanced against the needs for budget sus-
tainability, which should be achieved through financial
risk-management mechanisms. However, it is important
that funding considerations should not be conflated
with the assessment of clinical benefit – funding mat-
ters should be considered separately and subsequently
to the assessment of added value.
In summary, three elements are necessary to balance
the needs for financial sustainability against the need for
continuous development of OMPs: the continued priori-
tisation of rare diseases by EU and national policy-
makers, an appropriate pricing framework centred on
OMP value, and mechanisms to ensure long-term finan-
cial sustainability of OMPs.
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